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Abstract
Using representative household panel data, we show that the investment behavior of
households is related to the economic locus of control of household heads. A house-
hold’s internal locus of control in economic issues is positively related to its decision
to hold risky assets as well as its share of risky investments. We find evidence that
these relations are due to a lower perception of the risk of investing in risky assets:
Those who have an internal economic locus of control perceive less variance in risky
assets, which makes these assets more attractive. The relation between investment
in risky assets and locus of control cannot be explained by risk and time preferences
or by personality traits such as optimism and the Big Five traits. Furthermore, the
relation is independent of household socioeconomic background in terms of wealth
or knowledge—it holds for sophisticated and unsophisticated households alike.
JEL classification: G11; D14; D19
Keywords: Household finance; Internal locus of control; Personality trait; Risk
perception
∗Corresponding author: Research Center for Education and the Labour Market (ROA), Maastricht
University, 6211 LM, Maastricht, The Netherlands. Tel. +31 43 388 3647; fax +31 43 388 4914.
E-mail address: n.salamancaacosta@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1 Introduction
The rising participation of households in the stock market requires that we better under-
stand the determinants of their investment behavior. The models of portfolio choice—
both static and through the life cycle—that have guided our understanding in this matter
underline risk and time preferences as the key determinants of individual investment be-
havior (e.g., Merton, 1969; Samuelson, 1969; Bodie et al., 1992; Cocco et al., 2005; Gomes
and Michaelides, 2005; Benzoni et al., 2007). Recent studies show that characteristics
such as social preferences and financial literacy also play an important role (e.g., Hong
et al., 2005; Guiso et al., 2008; Van Rooij et al., 2011). However, only a few personality
traits, such as overconfidence and optimism, have been identified as drivers of investment
behavior so far. This is particularly surprising, considering the rapid growth of the be-
havioral finance literature since De Bondt (1998). Data constraints are one of the major
reasons for this research gap; economic preferences, personality traits, and investment
decisions are seldom jointly observed in one dataset. Another reason is that, apart from
overconfidence and optimism, personality traits are hard to incorporate into expected util-
ity models. However, the fact that they are harder to model does not mean that they do
not matter; the literature on non-cognitive traits suggests that many of these personality
aspects are likely to be important for several economic outcomes (e.g., Heckman et al.,
2006; Borghans et al., 2008; Almlund et al., 2011).
This paper focuses on a person’s internal economic locus of control, one of the per-
sonality traits that has received the most attention in studies on household investment
decisions in various fields. An internal economic locus of control measures the extent to
which a person believes that the economic outcomes in his or her life are due to personal
efforts, as opposed to the result of luck, change, fate, or the intervention and influence of
others (Rotter, 1966; Furnham, 1986). There is evidence that internal locus of control is
important in a range of economic situations, such as the labor market (e.g., Bowles et al.,
2001a,b; Coleman and DeLeire, 2003; Heineck and Anger, 2010) and the credit market
(Tokunaga, 1993), as well as entrepreneurship (Evans and Leighton, 1989), which sug-
gests it can be an important predictor of individual investment decisions. Our hypotheses
are that, in addition to risk and time preferences, having an internal economic locus of
control positively relates to the decision to participate in risky assets, as well as the share
of risky investments in a household’s total portfolio. We propose that these results are
driven by the relation between internal locus of control and the subjective perception of
risk in risky assets.
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An important body of the personality and clinical psychology literature supports this
mechanism. Slovic (1992) and Riechard and Peterson (1998) argue that the perceived
risk is lower when people believe they have control over the risky situation. Kallmen
(2000) provides a direct test of this hypothesis by showing that internal locus of control is
associated with a lower perception of risk regarding behaviors such as smoking, drinking
alcohol, and traffic accidents. Crisp and Barber (1995) survey several papers showing the
relation between internal locus of control and objective knowledge of the risk involved in
various health-related choices. They also show that a person’s internal locus of control
is related to different assessments of the risk involved in various sexual activities. Our
paper focuses on a person’s economic locus of control, that is, the extent to which a
person believes that his or her economic outcomes are determined by personal effort.1 If a
person’s internal economic locus of control is indeed related to the perceived risk of risky
asset investments, as suggested by the literature mentioned above, then internal economic
locus of control will be positively related to the decision to participate in risky assets and
to the risky share of investments.
We use representative household data to test the hypotheses outlined above. Our main
results show that a one standard deviation increase in internal locus of control increases
the probability of participating in risky assets by 4.8 percentage points and increases the
risky share of investments by 1.7 percentage points. These magnitudes are economically
important, since they correspond to around 15% of their unconditional means. Using a
selection of households that invest in options, we provide evidence consistent with our
proposed mechanism that internal locus of control affects risky asset investments through
differences in risk perception.
Our robustness analyses deal with several possible issues in our estimation. We first
show that our main results are not due to internal locus of control acting as a proxy for
unobserved optimism or other personality traits as measured by the Big Five. Second,
we show evidence suggesting that other drivers of the relation between internal locus
of control and risky asset investment (e.g., optimism and other personality traits) are
unlikely to play an important role. Third, we show that our main findings also hold
for more sophisticated households (i.e., well educated, financially literate, and wealthy),
whereas other financial behavioral biases are usually particularly important for less skilled
1In economics there is no model that links locus of control to the perception of risk, but Heckman
et al. (2006) show that a measure of non-cognitive skills, of which one main component is a person’s
internal locus of control, is related to several risky activities and their outcomes, such as smoking and
drug use.
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households (e.g., Agnew and Szykman, 2005; Calvet et al., 2009). Finally, we investigate
the role of measurement error in our estimation and conclude that our main results are
not due to a correlated measurement error artifact.
Our findings complement the literature on behavioral and psychological drivers of in-
dividual financial investment (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; De Bondt, 1998; Barber and
Odean, 2001; Puri and Robinson, 2007). This literature’s primary focus is on optimism
and overconfidence and how they affect individual investment decisions. However, this
literature has largely ignored other personality traits, such as locus of control, that are
better established in personality psychology and can add to our understanding of indi-
vidual investment from a different perspective.2 Our study also shifts away from the
predominant focus on the portfolio allocation of assets for households that already in-
vest in risky assets, since it focuses on the decision to participate in risky assets and the
overall share of household wealth allocated to them (the intensive and extensive mar-
gins). Our results have more common ground with other studies on the behavioral drivers
of risky asset participation (e.g., Van Rooij et al., 2011) and we show that internal lo-
cus of control adds to our understanding of this participation decision, on top of other
proposed explanations in this literature.3 Specifically, we show that the lack of internal
locus of control provides a feasible explanation for the non-participation in risky assets
of wealthier, better-educated, and more financially literate households, which is a part of
the equity participation puzzle that is often difficult to explain (e.g., Mehra and Prescott,
1985; Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Heaton and Lucas, 2001).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data.
Section 3 presents the main relation between internal locus of control and investment in
risky assets and explores the variance perception mechanism. Section 4 presents several
robustness checks of our main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
For this study we use information from the 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009 waves of the Dutch
Central Bank Household Survey (DHS), an annual panel survey of Dutch households
2Two exceptions are the studies of McInish (1982) and Durand et al. (2008), who view personality
traits in a financial investment context. However, both studies are silent on the extensive and intensive
margins of risky assets investment. More importantly, their samples are highly selective.
3See, for example, Hong et al. (2005); Guiso et al. (2008); Christelis et al. (2009), and Kaustia and
Torstila (2011) for other studies that explain household participation in risky assets.
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designed to be representative of the Dutch population over the age of 16.4 To analyze
investment decisions at the household level, we only use the information provided by
persons responsible for a household’s finances since they report the household’s joint
asset holdings. Our estimation sample includes only households for which we have data on
financial assets, measures of economic locus of control, and other socioeconomic variables
used as control variables. We observe 1,373 households, for a total of 3,365 household–year
observations.5
We define participating in risky assets as holding a positive amount of money in at least
one of the following financial products: mutual funds and mutual fund accounts, stocks
and shares, open put or call option positions, and substantial stock holdings (excluding
private equity holdings in their own company). To calculate household total financial
wealth, we add up the total value of the household’s equity, bonds, savings, and current
account balances, savings certificates, insurance policies, growth funds, own private equity,
and other savings. We use risky asset holdings and total financial wealth to construct the
two main dependent variables for our analyses: a dummy variable for investors in risky
assets and the risky share of investments, which is just the value of risky assets held as a
proportion of total financial wealth.6
The DHS includes a block of 13 statements measuring internal economic locus of
control. As mentioned above, economic locus of control captures the extent to which a
person believes that the economic outcomes in his or her life are due to personal effort,
as opposed to the result of luck, change, fate, or the intervention and influence of others.7
The 13 statements measure the survey respondents’ agreement with the importance of
their own actions to their wealth in various situations and all are measured in a seven-
point Likert scale. These statements are a subset of items from Furnham (1986).8 We
4For a detailed description of the DHS, see Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) or visit the CentERdata website
at www.centerdata.nl.
5About 2,000 household heads report household asset holdings in the sample period, but some 500 of
lacked household income or other labor market-related information and 150 did not answer the internal
locus of control or economic preference questions. However, there are no pronounced differences between
our estimation sample and the overall sample in terms of other observable characteristics.
6Our results are robust to definitions of risky assets that exclude bonds, mixed mutual funds, and
substantial stock holdings or that include non-residential real estate. Most of our results also hold when
we define risky asset investors as those holding risky assets in excess of e1,000 or e10,000.
7It is believed that locus of control forms during childhood and stabilizes during adolescence (Sherman,
1984).
8Van Daalen et al. (2008) provide evidence on the reliability and cross-cultural validity of Furnham’s
statements, whereas Plunkett and Buehner (2007) show that internal economic locus of control measured
by the Furnham scales is positively correlated with internal locus of control measured by the Rotter
scales.
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measure internal locus of control using the mean of these 13 statements, giving higher
scores to people with a stronger internal locus of control (i.e., those who believe their
economic outcomes are determined by their own efforts) and lower scores to people with
an external economic locus of control (i.e., those who believe that their economic outcomes
are determined by factors outside their control).9 To facilitate the interpretation of our
results, we standardize this index by subtracting its sample mean and dividing it by its
standard deviation.10
The DHS also includes information on peoples’ risk and time preferences. To measure
risk preferences, the survey asks people to state their agreement with six statements
regarding their preferences for risk in various financial decisions—therefore measuring
risk preferences in the financial domain. Using earlier waves of the DHS, both Warneryd
(1996) and Kapteyn and Teppa (2011) show that risk preferences measured this way relate
to investment behavior and to risk preferences elicited using lottery choices (e.g., Barsky
et al., 1997). The survey questionnaire also includes 12 questions measuring patience and
the extent to which individuals consider the future consequences of their current decisions
from Strathman et al. (1994).11 Using previous waves of the DHS, Borghans and Golsteyn
(2006) show that these questions are closely related to subjective discount rates elicited
through hypothetical choices between current and future consumption. We construct
standardized indices for risk aversion (where higher scores indicate less willingness to
take risks) and patience (where higher scores indicate more patience or, equivalently, a
lower intertemporal discount rate) similarly to the way we constructed the internal locus
of control index.12
We control for an extensive set of individual and household characteristics that may
9Even though both locus of control and economic locus of control were originally devised as multi-
dimensional personality traits, nowadays it is common to operationalize them through internal–external
reduction, just as we do (Rotter, 1990). This is common practice in the literature (e.g., McInish, 1982;
Coleman and DeLeire, 2003; Cebi, 2007).
10The unstandardized internal locus of control index is bell shaped and spread across the entire possible
range of scores, with a mean of 4.6 and a variance of 0.48. Our results are robust to different constructions
of the index. For example, we obtain similar results by using the first principal component from an analysis
of all economic locus of control items.
11We find that our measure of internal economic locus of control is negatively correlated to risk aversion
and positively correlated to patience, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g., McInish, 1982;
Plunkett and Buehner, 2007). Some of the items included in the patience measure are similar to internal
locus of control items, which could cause a spuriously high correlation between the two measures. Our
main analysis uses the index constructed with all items, but our results all hold if we use only those items
that most clearly measure patience to construct the index.
12See Appendix A for a full listing of the items used to construct the internal locus of control, risk
aversion, and patience indices.
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be correlated with internal locus of control and that have been shown to be important
for household investment decisions. Our analyses include individual characteristics of
the household head such as a quadratic term for age, marital status, gender, high school
and university education, self-reported financial literacy, and employment status. We also
include household characteristics such as a home ownership dummy, the number of people
living in the household, and total household income, household wealth, and household debt
(in logs). All regressions include year and region dummies and a set of dummies marking
the number of times we observe each household to account for differences in households
that remain longer in the panel. Table 1 shows summary statistics for our estimation
sample.13
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3 Results
3.1 Equity participation and the risky share of assets
Figures 1 and 2 show non-parametrically how the probability to participate in risky assets
and the risky share of investments, respectively, increase with a higher internal locus of
control. Both figures show positive relations between the risky investment variables and
internal locus of control and suggest that these relations are approximately linear. Table 2
shows that the positive relation between internal locus of control and investment in risky
assets observed in Figures 1 and 2 still holds after controlling for various individual and
household characteristics. The table reports the marginal effects from a probit model on
the probability of investing in risky assets and the marginal effects from a Tobit model
on the risky share of investments.14
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
13Our sample statistics are similar to those of the overall sample in the DHS. Accounting for differences
between asset classifications, our estimation sample is similar to the DHS 2005 wave used by Guiso et al.
(2008). None of our main results change if we use population weights for the analyses.
14The probit and Tobit models use pooled cross-sectional data. We use these models because they
best suit our data. We obtain very similar results using random effect-limited dependent variable models,
with the disadvantage that their results are sensitive to the numerical methods underlying the estimation.
Models with household fixed effects are unsuitable for our research question since we want to identify
the effect of internal locus of control, which seems to be time invariant in our sample, consistent with
the findings of Sherman (1984). Mundlak (1978)’s or Chamberlain (1980)’s treatment of the random
effects suffers from the same problem. The downside of not using panel models is that we cannot control
for unobserved household heterogeneity, but Table B.1 shows that this is not likely to change our main
results.
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 illustrate the size and significance, respectively, of the
relation between internal locus of control and the decision to participate in risky assets.
Columns 3 and 4 do the same for the risky share of investments. Estimation results show
that a one standard deviation increase in internal locus of control corresponds to a 4.8
percentage point increase in the probability to invest in risky assets and a 1.7 percentage
point increase in the risky share of investments. These marginal effects are relatively large;
they correspond to around 15% of the unconditional means of the investment variables. In
fact, the risky asset participation impact we found for internal locus of control is similar
to the effect of a one standard deviation increase in trust (Guiso et al., 2008), twice as
large as the impact of a one standard deviation in numeracy (Christelis et al., 2009) and
half as large as the impact of a one standard deviation in financial literacy (Van Rooij
et al., 2011).
Columns 2 and 4 show that including risk aversion, patience, and financial literacy
in the models has little effect on the marginal effects of internal locus of control.15 Risk
aversion has a large and negative effect on both the decision to participate in risky assets
and the risky share of investments, which is consistent with most portfolio models and
with the majority of empirical studies on stock market participation. Patience has large
positive effects in both equations. Financial literacy also has strong positive effects in
both equations, consistent with Van Rooij et al. (2011).
Most of the control variables in our regressions affect the investment variable in the
expected manner. There are large gender differences in investment, with female-headed
households being less likely to invest at both the intensive and extensive margins in risky
assets. These gender effects could be due to a number of reasons, ranging from lower
future earnings for women—which are not captured by either wealth or current income—
to gender personality differences unrelated to internal locus of control. There are also
large positive wealth and education relations with investment and a negative relation
with self-employment. The latter is usually attributed to the higher risk exposure of
self-employed households. Most of these effects are also found in other studies.16
15The special attention paid to risk and time preferences is based on the many theoretical models that
motivate their role in individual portfolio choice (e.g., Samuelson, 1969; Svensson, 1989) and the empirical
correlation between these two variables and internal locus of control, which is shown for time preferences
by Plunkett and Buehner (2007) and suggested for risk aversion by McInish (1982). Financial literacy
is also of particular importance, since it is an important driver of risky asset participation and the risky
share of investments (Van Rooij et al., 2011); moreover, it proxies for investor sophistication, which can
potentially change the determinants of investment decisions (e.g., Agnew and Szykman, 2005).
16We performed an extensive control analysis of the model specification. In particular, we used more
disaggregated measures of education, included wealth and debt as distribution deciles, modified our in-
7
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Variance perception
Our hypothesis on the mechanism underlying our main findings is that households with an
internal locus of control believe that the variance of risky asset returns is lower than the one
perceived for those with an external locus of control (cf. Kallmen, 2000), inducing higher
participation rates and shares of risky investments. We test this hypothesis indirectly
by exploiting the relation between the prices of financial options (one of the components
of our risky asset category) and the return variance of their underlying assets. Under
the assumption that internal locus of control is indeed negatively related to perceived
risk in risky assets, a stronger internal locus of control lowers this perceived risk and
thus encourages risk-averse households to hold more such assets. However, in the case of
financial options, lower risk means lower prices (Black and Scholes, 1973). In that case,
prospective investors with a stronger internal locus of control will perceive the market
prices of options as relatively high compared to their own valuation and will thus be less
likely to buy and more likely to (short-)sell them.17
The DHS collects detailed information on the respondents’ types of option investments.
In particular, it asks whether households have open positions in financial options and
whether they bought or sold them (i.e., whether they are in long or short positions). We
test our hypothesized mechanism by looking at the behavior of these option investors:
If our hypothesis is correct, internal locus of control should be negatively related to the
likelihood of buying options and positively related to the likelihood of selling them. Table
3 shows exactly this pattern: In a multinomial logit model, internal locus of control has a
significant and positive marginal effect on the likelihood of selling options, while the effect
on the chance of buying options is insignificant. The negative marginal effect on neither
buying nor selling options is a reflection of the main relation between internal locus of
come measure, and checked for possible non-linearities in all our variables, including internal locus of
control. Our main results are robust to these specification checks, in both size and statistical significance.
We also paid special attention to disaggregated wealth measures. In additional regressions we separated
wealth into financial wealth, durable assets wealth (the estimated value of vehicles such as cars, motor-
cycles, boats, and caravans), and housing wealth. Both durable asset wealth and housing wealth have a
large and significant effect on the probability of holding equity, but once we include financial wealth they
become insignificant.
17The relation between option prices and risk is strictly true for the implied volatility of the underlying
asset. However, to the extent that implied volatility is predictive of future volatility—shown by, for
example, Fleming (1998)—the positive relation between perceived risk and option prices should hold.
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control and risky asset investment.18
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
4 Robustness Analyses
4.1 Optimism, price expectations, and the Big Five
So far we have interpreted our results based on the assumption that our measure of in-
ternal locus of control clearly captures this underlying personality trait. However, some
personality studies show a positive correlation between internal locus of control and op-
timism (e.g., Guarnera and Williams, 1987; Hoorens and Buunk, 1993). Therefore, it
is important to check that the effect of internal locus of control is not simply capturing
unobserved differences in optimism.
The DHS provides us with a way to control for optimism. The proxy variable we
use for this purpose is the standardized answer to the question “What is the chance of
having a sunny day tomorrow, according to you?”, which is originally coded in percentage
points.19 The first column of Table 4 shows that our optimism proxy is positively related
to the decision to participate in risky assets, as expected. However, the marginal effect of
internal locus of control remains virtually unchanged, which suggests that internal locus
of control is not simply acting as a proxy for optimism.
Another important driver of investment in risky assets is subjective return expecta-
tions, which can be related to optimism but are ultimately different. Even though internal
locus of control does not proxy for optimism, it could still proxy for inflated return ex-
pectations of risky assets. To address this issue, we use the answers to the following
18Our sample of option traders is small (only 42 households have open option positions), which makes
the significant coefficient of internal locus of control more remarkable.
19We have four different proxy variables for optimism: the question on the chances of a sunny day
tomorrow, a measure of happiness (e.g., Dember and Brooks, 1989; Wallis et al., 2005; Neff et al., 2007),
and two questions on life expectancy that we can turn into proxies for optimism similarly to Puri and
Robinson (2007). While none of these variables acts as a direct measure of optimism, the correlation
between all of them is positive and the correlations between them and other explanatory variables are
mostly the same and coincide with our intuitions about optimistic behavior. All proxies are strongly
correlated with each other and most are positively correlated with Big Five Extraversion and negatively
with Big Five Neuroticism, consistent with Williams (1992) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). We
choose the sunny day proxy because it has both the strongest correlation with internal locus of control
and with participation in risky assets. The internal locus of control coefficient does not change if we use
proxies other than the answers to the sunny day question. Combining the information of all proxies does
not yield different results.
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question, which was asked in the 2005 and 2006 waves of the DHS: “In the next two
years, how do you expect worldwide share prices to develop? Will the share prices rise or
drop or stay about equal?”. Following Guiso et al. (2008), we include a dummy variable
indicating respondents who believe the stock market will rise to control for positive return
expectations. The second column of Table 4 shows that the price expectations dummy
is a strong predictor of the decision to participate in risky assets. However, the marginal
effect of internal locus of control remains unaltered, suggesting that price expectations
are not driving the effect of internal locus of control either.
Finally, we consider whether internal locus of control is acting as a proxy for other per-
sonality traits.20 To rule out this possibility, we use a 50-item measure of the Big Five per-
sonality traits, included in the 2005 and 2009 waves of the DHS. The Big Five (Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) are a comprehensive,
data-driven inventory of traits considered to capture most personality differences (Gold-
berg, 1993). The Big Five have been the most commonly used tool to measure personality
for decades and there is widespread agreement within personality research about the five
underlying dimensions and their content (Barrick et al., 2003; Durand et al., 2008). We
measured each trait of the Big Five through 10 items and constructed a standardized
index for each trait similarly to the way we did for internal locus of control. The last
column of Table 4 shows that the marginal effect of internal locus of control is not affected
by including the Big Five in the analysis. None of the Big Five is statistically significant
beyond the 10% level or are not robust to alternative model specifications.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Other mechanisms
Even though our evidence suggests that the relation of internal locus of control and invest-
ment in risky assets works via the perception of risk, other mechanisms may be at play.
A first possible alternative is that internal locus of control has an effect on risky asset
investment via human capital. Coleman and DeLeire (2003) and Fouarge et al. (2013)
show that internal locus of control relates to human capital investment. More human
capital lowers information costs for investing in risky assets and can therefore increase
investments in these assets. In our data there is a strong correlation between internal
locus of control and human capital indicators—the level of education as well as financial
20The evidence presented by Durand et al. (2008) suggests this.
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literacy—that supports this hypothesis. However, human capital cannot completely ex-
plain the internal locus of control effect: Column 2 in Table 2 already shows that internal
locus of control retains a strong positive coefficient even after controlling for the level of
education and financial literacy.
A second alternative hypothesis is that internal locus of control affects risky asset
investment because it drives households to gather more and better information before
making investment decisions. This mechanism requires two conditions: that internal locus
of control relates to the choice of financial advice and that financial advice choice leads
to (greater) investment in risky assets. The first condition is supported in the context of
car purchasing by Srinivasan and Tikoo (1992), who show that a stronger internal locus
of control relates to searching for more information before making a purchase decision.
They attribute this result to lower perceived search costs and larger perceived benefits
for those with a stronger internal locus of control. The second condition is supported
by Shum and Faig (2006), who show that financial advice is predictive of stock market
participation. The DHS asks the respondents to define the most important advisor they
seek when making financial decisions, and we test this second alternative mechanism and
its two conditions by first relating internal locus of control to the households’ choices
of financial advisor and then relating this choice to investment in risky assets. However,
neither link is supported in our data: We find no relation between internal locus of control
and advisor choice nor any between advisor choice and investment in risky assets. In view
of the results presented in this section, we conclude that our hypothesis on the perceived
risk of risky assets is the most consistent with the data.
4.3 Heterogeneous effects
One particularity of the distribution of internal locus of control across our sample is that
we find households with a strong internal locus of control that vary greatly in their back-
ground characteristics: older and younger, females and males, wealthy and poor, high and
low income, and married and single, among others (see Figure B.1). We exploit this vari-
ation to document the heterogeneity in the relation between internal locus of control and
investment behavior. Previous research in behavioral finance has found evidence of such
heterogeneity. In particular it shows that other psychological biases disappear as investors
become more sophisticated. Agnew and Szykman (2005) show that non-participation, in-
vestment in company stock, and 1/n heuristics decrease as salaries increase. Calvet et al.
(2009) find that financial wealth, family size, and education decrease the prevalence of
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underdiversification, risk-taking inertia, and the disposition to hold losing stocks and sell
winning stocks.
Remarkably, as shown in Figure B.2, we find little heterogeneity in the relation be-
tween internal locus of control and investment in risky asset. This suggests that internal
locus of control affects investment decisions in a fundamentally different way than other
psychological biases that disappear for more sophisticated investors.
4.4 Measurement error
Our measure of internal locus of control combines the information in 13 different items and
we implicitly assume, as is usual with this type of aggregation, that each item measures
internal locus of control with some noise. Therefore combining the items decreases the
potential attenuation bias caused by measurement error. However, it is possible that some
bias remains. This holds for the marginal effects of internal locus of control, as well as
the effects of risk aversion and patience. To measure the remaining error, we calculate
the Cronbach alpha for each of our three indices.21
The first column of Table 5 shows the ordinary least squares coefficients of internal
locus of control, risk aversion, and patience on the probability of participating in risky
assets, each corrected for measurement error bias. The table shows the corrected marginal
effect of internal locus of control and thus the extent to which their economic size was
underestimated before. The estimated increase in the likelihood of investing in risky
assets is now estimated at six percentage points, or around 20% of the mean unconditional
investment probability. In addition, the first column of Table 5 allows us to assess the
relative importance of internal locus of control versus risk aversion and patience based
on the size of their coefficients. By comparing the coefficients, we see that even though
risk aversion seems to be the most important factor, internal locus of control plays an
important role in explaining investment in risky assets, with a coefficient that is 27% as
large.22
21See Mueller and Plug (2006) for an analogous approach to correct the effects of personality on
earnings. Since the bias of the coefficients due to measurement error in the error-in-variable model is not
explicitly calculated for a probit or logit model, we have to rely on linear probability models at this stage.
We also use instrumental variable methods and the Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) multiple-proxy
index to correct for attenuation bias and find similar results.
22This is not usually possible, since studies on equity participation do not have enough information to
estimate the measurement error in each of their variables (see e.g., Guiso et al., 2008). In our measurement
error-corrected model, the relative size of the coefficient can be directly compared, assuming that the
measurement error correction eliminates the attenuation bias or at least makes the bias of the coefficients
comparable.
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Although multi-item indices help us correct for attenuation bias, one of their drawbacks
is they can introduce an identification problem. Specifically, if the error term in any of
the 13 internal locus of control items is correlated with other regressors, our coefficients
could be biased or, in the worst case scenario, spuriously driven by this correlation. Both
risk aversion and patience could cause such a problem, since they are both constructed
using multi-item measures. To check whether correlated measurement error is driving
our results, we re-estimate the risky asset participation model including only one-item
measures of internal locus of control, risk aversion, and patience. By using these one-item
measures, we decrease the risk of the measurement error term in internal locus of control
being correlated with risk aversion or patience.23 The second column of Table 5 shows
that our main results hold if we use the one-item measures instead of the indices. The
coefficients are smaller than in Table 2, which is consistent with a stronger attenuation
bias in the one-item measures versus the indices.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
5 Conclusions
Recent studies in finance show that household investment decisions are related to factors
that are not fully captured by classical portfolio theory. In this paper we show that
a household head’s internal economic locus of control is an important determinant of
investment in risky assets, on top of economic preferences (risk and time preferences) and
socioeconomic characteristics. We find that internal economic locus of control is related
to both the decision to participate in risky assets and the risky share of investments
and we show that this relation is substantial. We further provide evidence supporting
the hypothesis that this relation is driven by the fact that those who have an internal
economic locus of control perceive lower risk when investing in risky assets.
Through various robustness analyses, we rule out the possibility that the relation
between internal economic locus of control and investment in risky assets is driven by
23This comes at the cost of a stronger attenuation bias, though. We chose the items based on how
unambiguously they seem to measure each trait a priori and all three items load highly on the first
principal component of their respective traits. The items chosen were the following: “It is chiefly a
matter of fate whether I become rich or poor” for internal locus of control, “I get more and more
convinced that I should take greater financial risks to improve my financial position” for risk aversion,
and “With everything I do, I am only concerned about the immediate consequences (say, a period of a
couple of days or weeks)” for patience. All questions were included with their original seven-point Likert
scale measures and all the item scores were reversed. The item means are 4.88, 5.27, and 4.28 and their
standard deviations are 1.45, 1.65, and 4.24, respectively.
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other variables prominent in the household finance literature. We also show that this
relation does not disappear as households become more sophisticated and that it is not
driven by measurement error artifacts.
Another important finding in our study is that the relation between internal economic
locus of control and investment in risky assets does not seem to be unique to any partic-
ular socioeconomic group; it is of equal importance for wealthy and poor, educated and
uneducated, and financially literate and illiterate households. This finding has several
important implications. First, it means that internal locus of control could be a suit-
able candidate for explaining the non-participation of households in risky asset markets
and the fact that even sophisticated households fail to participate when they optimally
should. Second, it suggests that the personality-driven bias in investment decisions may
also hold for highly sophisticated and knowledgeable investors, such as fund managers
and board members. Thus, even managers and board members with a stronger internal
economic locus of control could be steering the investment of their funds toward a more
equity-based strategy, compared to those with an external economic locus of control.
At this stage we do not know whether the investment bias related to internal locus
of control is ultimately beneficial or harmful for households. More research is needed
to determine whether the effects of internal locus of control and other personality traits
on investment decisions are to be treated as investment mistakes and whether having an
internal economic locus of control leads to higher returns on investments.
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Figure 1: Local polynomial regression of risky asset ownership on internal locus of control
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Figure 2: Local polynomial regression of the share of risky assets on internal locus of control
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Table 2: The relation between internal locus of control, risky asset ownership, and the share
of risky assets over financial wealth
Columns (1) and (2) show probit marginal effects at the mean on a dummy variable for households that
own risky assets. Columns (3) and (4) report Tobit marginal effects at the mean on the ratio of risky asset
holdings over financial wealth (from 0 to 100). All regressions include a full set of year and region dummies
and selection dummies as additional control variables. Standard errors clustered at the household level are
included in parenthesis. We report McFadden’s Pseudo R2 measure. *** denotes significance at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Risky asset ownership Risky asset share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal locus of control 0.048∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.435) (0.408)
Risk aversion −0.157∗∗∗ −5.142∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.435)
Patience 0.045∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.380)
Financial literacy 0.072∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗
(0.017) (0.527)
Age −0.000 0.001 −0.137 −0.127
(0.006) (0.007) (0.241) (0.216)
Age Squared (/100) 0.000 0.001 0.186 0.228
(0.006) (0.006) (0.226) (0.201)
Female −0.113∗∗∗ −0.014 −4.086∗∗∗ −0.303
(0.027) (0.030) (0.988) (0.949)
Married −0.048 −0.028 −2.307∗∗ −1.636
(0.032) (0.033) (1.167) (1.060)
Number of people in household 0.012 0.004 0.432 0.189
(0.013) (0.013) (0.426) (0.396)
Log. of household income −0.005 −0.010 −0.168 −0.353
(0.006) (0.007) (0.217) (0.240)
Log. of household wealth 0.154∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 4.596∗∗∗ 4.171∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.349) (0.333)
Log. of household debt −0.003 −0.006∗ 0.009 −0.055
(0.003) (0.003) (0.111) (0.103)
Lives in own house 0.031 0.000 1.817 1.183
(0.033) (0.034) (1.236) (1.143)
High school degree 0.051∗ 0.042 1.901∗ 1.536
(0.029) (0.030) (1.062) (0.990)
University degree 0.084∗∗ 0.054 3.270∗∗ 1.849
(0.039) (0.040) (1.328) (1.212)
Retired 0.009 0.018 0.249 0.730
(0.039) (0.039) (1.340) (1.185)
Self-employed −0.139∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −4.888∗∗ −6.402∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.063) (2.030) (1.948)
Unemployed −0.041 −0.060 −0.203 −0.093
(0.078) (0.080) (2.954) (2.764)
Observations 3,365 3,092 3,365 3,092
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.29 0.05 0.07
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Table 3: The relation between internal locus of control and buying and selling options
All columns show marginal effects on option investment choices from a multinomial
logit model. The dependent variable takes three values, depending on whether the
household is an option seller (Column 1), an option buyer (Column 2), or neither
(Column 3). We control for age, gender, marital status, household size, high school
and university education dummies, logs of wealth, debt and income, and dummies
for house owners, unemployed, and self–employed. Standard errors clustered at
the household level are included in parenthesis. We report McFadden’s Pseudo R2
measure. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the
10% level.
Seller Buyer Neither
(1) (2) (3)
Internal locus of control 0.003∗ 0.003 −0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 3,323
Pseudo R2 0.21
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Table 4: The relation between internal locus of control and risky asset ownership controlling
for optimism, return expectations, and the Big Five
All columns shows probit marginal effects at the mean on a dummy variable for house-
holds that own risky assets. Column (1) includes a standardized optimism proxy based
on the reported probability of a sunny day tomorrow. Column (2) includes a proxy
for price expectations as a dummy for expecting worldwide stock prices to rise over
the next two years (only available in 2005 and 2006). Column (3) includes the Big
Five personality traits (only available in 2005 and 2009). We control for age, gender,
marital status, household size, high school and university education dummies, logs
of wealth, debt and income, and dummies for house owners, unemployed, and self–
employed, year, and region dummies. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are included in parenthesis. We report McFadden’s Pseudo R2 measure. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Optimism Price exp. Big Five
(1) (2) (3)
Internal locus of control 0.047∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.014)
Optimism 0.017∗
(0.009)
Expects stock prices to rise 0.158∗∗∗
(0.035)
Openness 0.029∗
(0.015)
Conscientiousness −0.018
(0.015)
Extraversion 0.019
(0.014)
Agreeableness −0.006
(0.015)
Neuroticism 0.027∗
(0.015)
Observations 3,365 1,163 1,612
(Pseudo) R2 0.20 0.19 0.19
†The three regressions are estimated using different subsamples and therefore changes
in the coefficient of internal locus of control have to be interpreted based on different
baseline estimates. The baseline estimates are the ones of Table 2 for Column (1), and
0.049 and 0.037 for Columns (2) and (3), respectively.
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Table 5: Error–in–variable and One–item models of internal locus of control, risk aversion,
and patience on risky asset ownership
Column (1) shows error–in–variable coefficients of a linear probability models where
the dependent variable is a dummy for households that own risky assets. The correction
for classical measurement error follows Greene (p.84, 2003) and uses the Cronbach’s
alpha of internal locus of control (0.72), risk aversion (0.68) and patience (0.74) as an
indicator of their respective reliability. Column (2) shows probit marginal effects at the
mean of one–item measures of internal economic locus of control, risk aversion, and
patience on a dummy variable for households that own risky assets. We control for age,
gender, marital status, household size, high school and university education dummies,
logs of wealth, debt and income, and dummies for house owners, unemployed, and self–
employed, year, and region dummies. Standard errors clustered at the household level
are included in parenthesis. We report the R2 for the OLS regression and McFadden’s
Pseudo R2 measure for the probit regression. *** denotes significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Error–in–variable One–item measures
(1) (2)
Internal locus of control 0.060∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.011) (0.007)
Risk aversion −0.218∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.007)
Patience 0.052∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.006)
Observations 3,363 3,365
(Pseudo) R2 0.34 0.21
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Appendix A
Internal (economic) locus of control items:
Please indicate for the following statements to which extent you agree or disagree. 1 means
‘totally disagree’ and 7 means ‘totally agree’:
1. Saving and careful investing is a key factor in becoming rich
2. Whether or not I get to become wealthy depends mostly on my ability
3. In the long run, people who take very good care of their finances stay wealthy
4. If I become poor, it’s usually my own fault
5. I am usually able to protect my personal interests
6. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it
7. My life is determined by my own actions
8. There is little one can do to prevent poverty
9. Becoming rich has nothing to do with luck
10. Regarding money, there isn’t much you can do for yourself when you are poor
11. It’s not always wise for me to save because many things turn out to be a matter of
good or bad fortune
12. It is chiefly a matter of fate whether I become rich or poor
13. Only those who inherit or win money can possible become rich
Financial risk aversion items:
The following statements concern saving and taking risks. Please indicate on a scale from
1 to 7 to what extent you agree with the following statements, where 1 indicates ‘totally
disagree’ and 7 indicates ‘totally agree’:
1. I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than
to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns
2. I would never consider investments in shares because I find this too risky
3. If I think an investment will be profitable, I am prepared to borrow money to make
this investment
4. I want to be certain that my investments are safe
21
5. I get more and more convinced that I should take greater financial risks to improve
my financial position
6. I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to gain
money
Patience items:
Now follow some statements about the future. Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 to
what extent you agree with the following statements, where 1 indicates ‘totally disagree’
and 7 indicates ‘totally agree’:
1. I think about how things can change in the future, and try to influence those things
in my everyday life
2. I often work on things that will only pay off in a couple of years
3. I am only concerned about the present, because I trust that things will work them-
selves out in the future
4. With everything I do, I am only concerned about the immediate consequences (say
a period of a couple of days or weeks)
5. Whether something is convenient for me or not, to a large extent determines the
decisions that I take or the actions that I undertake
6. I am ready to sacrifice my well-being in the present to achieve certain results in the
future
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative consequences of my acts
seriously, even if these negative consequences would only occur in the distant future
8. I think it is more important to work on things that have important consequences in
the future, than to work on things that have immediate but less important conse-
quences
9. In general, I ignore warnings about future problems because I think these problems
will be solved before they get critical
10. I think there is no need to sacrifice things now for problems that lie in the future,
because it will always be possible to solve these future problems later
11. I only respond to urgent problems, trusting that problems that come up later can
be solved in a later stage
12. I get clear results in my daily work, this is more important to me than getting vague
results
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Appendix B
Figure B.1: Distribution of internal locus of control across our sample
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Figure B.2: Marginal effects of internal locus of control on investment in risky assets across
our sample
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Table B.1: The relation between internal locus of control, risky asset ownership, and the share
of risky assets over financial wealth using random effect panel models
Columns (1) and (2) show marginal effects at the mean for random effect logit regressions (assuming that
the unobserved individual heterogeneity is zero) on a dummy variables for households that own risky assets.
Columns (3) and (4) show marginal effects at the mean (assuming that the unobserved individual hetero-
geneity is zero) for random effect Tobit regressions on the ratio of risky asset holdings over financial wealth
(from 0 to 100). All the marginal effect calculations assume the unobserved individual heterogeneity to be
zero. All regressions include a full set of year and region dummies and selection dummies as additional
control variables. Standard errors clustered at the household level are included in parenthesis. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Risky asset ownership Risky asset share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal locus of control 0.0378∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0104) (0.354) (0.357)
Risk aversion −0.109∗∗∗ −4.094∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.367)
Patience 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.565∗
(0.0102) (0.338)
Financial literacy 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.501
(0.0147) (0.511)
Age 0.00244 −0.000552 0.00282 −0.162
(0.00657) (0.00594) (0.203) (0.194)
Age Squared (/100) −0.00124 0.00231 0.0703 0.248
(0.00615) (0.00554) (0.191) (0.181)
Female −0.144∗∗∗ −0.0493∗ −4.272∗∗∗ −1.308
(0.0290) (0.0268) (0.875) (0.879)
Married −0.0357 −0.0115 −2.549∗∗ −2.334∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0304) (0.993) (0.978)
Number of people in household 0.0170 0.00613 0.695∗ 0.387
(0.0130) (0.0122) (0.399) (0.400)
Log. of household income −0.00154 −0.00314 −0.249 −0.398∗∗
(0.00590) (0.00596) (0.183) (0.202)
Log. of household wealth 0.155∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 4.279∗∗∗ 4.315∗∗∗
(0.00999) (0.00977) (0.326) (0.331)
Log. of household debt −0.00337 −0.00443∗ −0.00829 −0.0453
(0.00260) (0.00245) (0.0851) (0.0853)
Lives in own house 0.0272 0.00900 0.972 1.336
(0.0294) (0.0282) (0.958) (0.983)
High school degree 0.0666∗∗ 0.0472∗ 2.037∗∗ 1.600∗
(0.0304) (0.0273) (0.962) (0.919)
University degree 0.127∗∗∗ 0.0759∗∗ 4.172∗∗∗ 2.839∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0357) (1.211) (1.156)
Retired −0.0111 −0.00502 −0.118 0.246
(0.0357) (0.0330) (1.077) (1.079)
Self-employed −0.140∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −5.654∗∗∗ −6.442∗∗∗
(0.0627) (0.0624) (2.047) (1.927)
Unemployed −0.0412 −0.0275 0.0554 −0.165
(0.0629) (0.0610) (2.026) (2.088)
Observations 3,365 3,092 3,365 3,092
25
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